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Abstract and Keywords
This article describes the conception of sensory perception during the early
modern period. It discusses David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature where
he contrasted the ancient metaphysics of substantial forms and occult
qualities with the metaphysics of the Moderns. The article argues that Hume
was fundamentally correct and that the doctrine of secondary qualities is
indeed a distinctively modern doctrine that captures something of the very
essence of the new philosophical age.
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In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume contrasted the ancient metaphysics
of substantial forms and occult qualities with the metaphysics of the
Moderns, which he characterized as follows: ‘The fundamental principle of
that philosophy is the opinion concerning colours, sounds, tastes, smells,
heat and cold; which it asserts to be nothing but impressions in the mind,
deriv'd from the operation of external objects, and without any resemblance
to the qualities of the objects’ (Hume 1985: 275). Hume evidently had in
mind the definition of secondary qualities that is given in Locke's Essay.
Locke had distinguished two kinds of qualities that may be considered in
bodies: (i) ‘original or primary Qualities’, that is, qualities ‘utterly inseparable
from the Body’, such as ‘Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion or Rest’; (ii)
‘secondary Qualities’, such as colours, sounds, or tastes, ‘which in truth are
nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations
in us by their primary Qualities, i.e. by the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion
of their insensible parts’ (Essay II. viii. 9–10). Locke had also explained that,
in contrast with ideas of primary qualities, the ‘Ideas, produced in us by
these Secondary Qualities, have no resemblance of them (the qualities
of bodies) at all’ (Essay II. viii. 15). Although Hume's own appreciation
of the doctrine is rather critical, it is striking that he describes it as the
‘fundamental principle’ of ‘the modern philosophy’. I shall argue in what
follows that Hume was fundamentally correct, and that the doctrine of
secondary qualities is indeed a distinctively modern doctrine that captures
something of the very essence of the new philosophical age.
Hume was not the only author of the eighteenth century who believed that
‘modern philosophy’ was deeply committed to the theory of secondary
qualities. The opinion was implicit in many writings of the time, and
especially in popular accounts of science and philosophy intended for
ladies or for philosophically uneducated people. There is a telling example
in a famous article by Joseph Addison, in the Spectator. There Addison
invokes ‘that great modern discovery… namely, that light and colours,
as apprehended by the imagination, are only ideas in the mind, and not
qualities that have any existence in matter.’ Following this discovery, Addison
invites his reader to meditate on the ‘secret spell’ that governs our lives:
In short, our souls are at present delightfully lost and
bewildered in a pleasing delusion and we walk about like the
enchanted hero of a romance who sees beautiful castles,
woods, and meadows, and at the same time hears the warbling
of birds and the purling of streams; but upon the finishing
of some secret spell the fantastic scene breaks up, and the
disconsolate knight finds himself on a barren heath or in a
solitary desert. (Addison 1712)
This image captures a distinctive feature of the modern mind. The modern
philosopher, having recognized the spell of the senses, has to face the barren
nature of the physical world. There is no longer room for the qualities that
make human existence pleasing or beautiful. One may accept this with
equanimity, as Addison seems to have done, and accept the fact that all
the beauty of the world is a mere creation of the imagination. Alternatively,
one may lament this new state of affairs and see in the doctrine of qualities
the seeds of modern despair and scepticism. This was Berkeley's motive for
rejecting modern philosophy in general and Locke's doctrine of secondary
qualities in particular, and this line of thought is still well represented in our
time.
I: Modern Qualities: the Philosophical Core
What then is the doctrine of qualities to which Hume and his contemporaries
refer (for complaint or for praise) as the great principle of ‘modern
philosophy’? Part of the answer is found in Locke's Essay, where the doctrine
is stated in its full force and with the greatest detail. However, as we shall
see, Locke's theory is in many respects more specific than the general
doctrine it exemplifies and promotes. The core of the doctrine had been
expressed in various philosophical contexts during the seventeenth century,
long before Locke stamped the now received terminology of ‘primary and
secondary qualities’.1
Many authors who defend one form or another of the doctrine rely on a
strange piece of hypothesizing. Suppose that human beings and all other
sensible beings were entirely annihilated. The question is then asked:
what could still be said of the remaining material world, the bodies and
corpuscles it comprises? Or what is it like for something (say a body, a
material substance) to exist unperceived, without the mind? Does it make
sense to say that it is solid and extended, red or green, warm or cold, where
there are no eyes to see, no flesh to feel? The ‘modern’ answer is twofold:
were all animals annihilated, insensitive corporeal things would continue to
exist unperceived with some sort of qualities, such as extension, motion, or
contexture of parts (the exact list is open to discussion), but there is also
a set of ‘sensory’ qualities usually attributed to them, such as colours or
tastes (this list is also open to discussion), that would simply vanish. As Locke
says in the Essay (II. xxxi. 2): ‘there would yet be no more Light, or Heat in
the World, than there would be Pain if there were no sensible Creature to
feel it, though the Sun should continue just as it is now, and Mount Aetna
flame higher than ever it did.’ A similar argument is found in Galileo: ‘if the
living creature were removed, all these qualities would be removed and
annihilated’ (E.N. VI, 347; Shea 1977: 100), and in Boyle: ‘if there were no
Sensitive Beings those Bodies that are now the Objects of our Senses would
be but dispositively, if I may so speak, endow'd with Colours, Tasts, and the
like; and actually, but onely with those more Catholick Affections of Bodies,
Figure, Motion, Texture, etc.’ (B: V, 319).
Whatever the subtle distinctions one may find between these quotations,
Galileo, Boyle, and Locke share an assumption that the question they ask
is both meaningful and answerable. Not only does it make sense to ask
questions about ‘things unperceived’ (a point that Berkeley will deny2),
but it is also possible to give a probable account of the intrinsic qualities of
such things, as they are in themselves (a point that Kant will deny (Allais
2008)). We may call this the accessibility thesis, although it might be said
that it is no more or no less than crude ‘pre‐critical’ metaphysical realism (cf.
Meillassoux 2006: 13–38).
A second common assumption, of equal importance, is what may be called
the discrepancy thesis. It says that things external to the mind do not
resemble the way they are in the mind, when we perceive them or imagine
them. When we perceive them, we tend to attribute to them qualities that
exist only because the things are related to us or perceived by us, but these
are not their intrinsic or real qualities. Such additional qualities are usually
called ‘secondary qualities’ in Locke's idiom, but they may as well be called
(as they are once in Locke's Essay II. viii. 22) ‘imputed qualities’. Things just
look like such. As a consequence, there is a deep epistemological divide
between two images of the world: one presents the world as it looks—
the commonsensical world of ordinary experience, coloured, tasteful, and
humanized; the other presents it as it is, that is, sub specie aeternitatis, in its
pristine and inexorable existence. This latter is what we may call, borrowing
Wilfrid Sellars' famous phrase, the early modern ‘scientific image’ (Sellars
1963: 19–20).
II: Cosmological Context
Before considering more closely these assumptions, and in order better to
understand their true import and modernity, we shall focus a little more on
the thought experiment from which they stem, namely: what would it be
like for something material to exist in a world that is entirely devoid of living
sensible habitants? Although it may seem a strange question to ask, the
fascination it exerted on the Moderns is undeniable and understandable.
The question captures in a somewhat radical fashion the metaphysical
uneasiness that accompanied recent discoveries and speculations of natural
philosophy. Microscopes and telescopes, those epoch‐making instruments,
had shown that there are many things in the world that had existed
unperceived since the beginnings of humanity, and they also suggested that
there were probably many more situated in the recesses of the universe,
well beyond the capacity of our best instruments. These newly discovered
(or speculated) ‘invisible worlds’ had a significant influence on the modern
attitude toward nature (Wilson 1995; Hamou 1999–2001). They suggested
that the whole Creation is not proportionate to, nor intended for, human
existence, human perception, or human thought.
A similar insight arose from new cosmological speculations which considered
infinite spaces (real or imaginary) situated beyond the scope of our senses,
or infinite times (real or imaginary) displayed before or after the existence of
mankind. Although a majority of philosophers in the seventeenth century still
accepted as literally true the biblical chronology, which assigned a beginning
and end not only to human existence but also to the material world created
for men's use, there was a growing tendency to think that Creation would
be better understood if we could extend its genetic development in a longer
imaginary ancestral time. La fable du monde, the cosmogenesis described
in Descartes' Traité de la lumière, is probably the best example of the way
modern philosophers, who pretended to believe in the literal meaning of
the seven days of Creation, indulged in such fictional narratives (AT XI 31–
2; CSM I 90). This potential extension of space and time well beyond human
or sensitive existence was an important sequel to the Copernican revolution.
Although some Copernicans of the first generation, such as Kepler (KGW IV
309; Kepler 1965: 46), still held that the new position and movement of the
Earth among its sister planets is best suited to realize man's destination as
Contemplator of nature, this anthropocentric confidence faltered when it
became apparent, by the mid‐seventeenth century, that the system of the
Sun had no cosmic privilege at all but was a very small, local, and peripheral
part of the universe (Van Helden 1985).
These ideas also gained strength from their association with some features
of the newly rediscovered Epicurean cosmology, which had a deep hold
on the imagination of the Moderns, even on those who most vehemently
objected to it (Wilson 2008). Among those Epicurean theses was the idea
that the world, as we know it here and now, is the temporary result of a
long process of atomic collisions and concatenations, which has already
produced and destroyed many worlds before the first living being was even
produced. Because of such considerations, it was easy to transmute the
annihilation thought‐experiment into other questions more clearly attuned
to the scientific preoccupations of the time. How, for example, shall we
describe the reality of a bare planet, revolving in a deserted part of the
universe, much too far away for the best instrument to capture its image, or
much too ancestral for any living creature to contemplate it? Or what sort of
reality shall we attribute to the minutest parts of matter, which even the best
microscope cannot access?
Of course the ‘new theory of qualities’ is not directly deducible from
this cosmological context. The modern sensitivity to worlds beyond our
perception only makes room for a doctrine that conjugates, in a rather
intricate manner, a new ontology and epistemology. The modern doctrine
of qualities is an ontological doctrine, which deals with the very being or
essence of material substances. It is also an epistemological doctrine about
the way we get access to that intrinsic nature, and the reasons why we
usually mistake that nature and impute to it qualities that do not exist.
III: Ontology
The term ‘quality’ still retains, for an early modern ear, some of its
Aristotelian overtones. For Aristotle, quality is one of the ten categories, a
mode of being. Aristotle defines it in general as that in virtue of which things,
substances, people, are said to be such and such. Thus, the qualities are
those inherent and more or less lasting features, habits, or dispositions of
substances that specify them, and allow for such or such denomination and
predication. More specifically, the qualities that Aristotle called ‘affective
(or sensory) qualities’ are those features of a substance that allow such and
such denomination, because of the way the senses are affected when the
substance is presented to them. For example ‘Socrates is white’ means that
there is in Socrates an intrinsic feature called ‘whiteness’ that makes us see
Socrates as a white man. In short, a quality‐name is, in the ancient doctrine,
a term whose meaning captures something of the true, intrinsic nature of the
thing, so that the particular that is qualified (e.g. Socrates' whiteness) can be
considered as a true instantiation of the qualifying genus (the ‘form’: white),
and may be legitimately called by its name, through what Aristotle called
‘paronymy’ (AR I, 3).
Part of this ontological description still makes sense for modern philosophers,
for whom a quality is, generally speaking, the cause why something
is qualified in such and such a manner. So it is legitimate to say that a
substance, like porphyry, is red because it has certain intrinsic features that
cause us to perceive it as red. Some Moderns would say that porphyry has ‘a
rubrific property’ (Newton 1721: 108), or a ‘power’ to produce a perception
of red (Locke Essay II. viii), or again a ‘disposition’ to appear red (Boyle B,
V 319). An Aristotelian would have no qualms with these denominations:
redness, in peripatetic philosophy, is certainly a potentia, a rubrific property:
it makes people see red. However, for Aristotle, redness is more than that.
It is a real quality that shares not only its name but also its essence with the
form perceived; ‘red’ is an integral part of the real essence of a substance
that is perceived as red. This real feature is embodied in porphyry and exists
whether the porphyry is actually perceived or not. This is the point at which
the ancients and moderns diverge.
In the modern theory of qualities, an affective or secondary quality receives
its name only because of the causal relation between the sensible and
the sentient. This process is ‘metonymic’; as Leibniz says, we name the
cause after the effect (A VI/VI: 135), and there is room for equivocation
here. In principle, cause and effect are distinct. There is no reason to
assume, simply because of the causal relation, that there exists a likeness
between a given quality and its perceptual effect or that the one should be
a particular instance of the other. For example, although it is proper to say
that porphyry is red, this does not necessarily mean that something, among
the intrinsic features of porphyry, is an instance of ‘redness’ or a likeness of
that sensation that I receive in my mind when I perceive red things. Most of
the moderns think that there is something else (not ‘redness’, but some sort
of texture or disposition of parts) in porphyry that causes us to perceive it
as red and to name it accordingly. If so, redness is not a real quality, in the
strictest Aristotelian sense of the term; it is, as Locke says, only a power to
produce a perception of red or, as Galileo puts it, only a name for something
in porphyry that is not red but which makes porphyry look red.
The moderns' critique of the peripatetic doctrine of ‘real qualities’ is
well expressed by Malebranche when he says that the ancients failed to
acknowledge that ‘their physics was nothing but a kind of logic’.
It is clear to anyone who has read a little that practically all
books of science…are full of argument based on elementary
qualities and on secondary qualities such as attractive,
retentive, concoctives, expulsives, and other such items, on
other qualities they call occult, on specific virtues, and on
several other entities men compose from the general idea of
being and the idea of the cause of the effect they observe.
…If these ordinary philosophers contented themselves with
offering their physics simply as a logic that might furnish
appropriate terms for discussing the things of nature…we
would find no complaint in what they do. But they pretend to
explain nature through their general and abstract terms, as if
nature were abstract. (OCM III 458–9: MLO 242)
This was the same sort of error as occurred with the so‐called ‘occult
qualities’. Opium makes one sleep and, as a consequence, it may be said
to have a ‘dormitive power’. The fire heats things, and so there must be
something in fire (call it ‘heat’) that causes this effect. In general, from
any sentence expressing a causal action, one may abstract a substantive
predicate (a quality) that can be attributed to the subject.
But this is grammar (or logic), not physics. The peripatetic quality, as
Malebranche says, ‘did not arouse other ideas in our minds than the ideas of
being and cause in general’ (OCM III 458; MLO 242). In naming the quality we
just describe the fact that there is something in the object that causes some
effect (AT VIII‐1 34; CSM I 218), but we do not thereby explain anything.
‘Heat’, ‘gravity’, ‘dormitive power’, or even ‘redness’ do not explain the
actions of heating, weighing, inducing sleep, or making one see red; they
merely name them. The mistake occurs when one substantiates the referents
of these terms by considering them as real or formal entities.
Of course the critic of the ancient doctrine of qualities does not rely entirely
on this alleged confusion between grammar and physics. After all, it might be
the case that things such as ‘real qualities’ exist in matter, even though the
mere fact that we have sensory impressions is not a good argument for that.
So the disagreement between the Ancients and the Moderns is deeper. What
is at stake is the general picture of the physical world that each accepts:
what kind of physical entities should we reckon as making up the furniture
of the world? What are those that really explain the behaviour of matter
and, in particular, the fact that matter makes itself perceptible? For various
reasons the Moderns do not think that the Aristotelian ‘real qualities’ are
good candidates.
First, there are too many of them. One important argument invokes some
version of Ockham's razor: one must not multiply entities without necessity.
The ancients believe that there are as many real qualities, either manifest or
occult, as we have names for the various effects of matter. But one should
expect from a good explanatory principle that it allow for some degree of
reduction, that it attributes a greater number of effects to a lesser number
of causes—the fewer the causes, the better the explanation. In contrast, the
ancients' real qualities are explanatory in a piecemeal and ad hoc manner.
In particular, sensory qualities, such as colour, do not seem to have any
function other than to explain why things should appear to us such and such
(Smith 1990: 225), which is clearly anthropocentric. To a mind attuned to
the new cosmological insights, it should not be the case that material things
possess certain real intrinsic features whose unique ratio essendi is to make
them perceptible to animal beings.
Although it had been commonly voiced among early modern philosophers,
such criticism does not do justice to the Aristotelian doctrine of matter, which
was strongly reductive. Some affective qualities, such as heat and cold,
dry and moist, were considered as primary and essential, and were paired
in every material substance (AR 539). Other qualities (including colours)
were, in various degrees, derivative, compound, and accidental (‘secondary’
in this sense). Besides, some qualities had an active causal power, while
others were only passive. Thus when the moderns criticized the lack of
explanatory power of real qualities, it was not solely on account of Ockam's
razor, although they certainly considered their own doctrine of matter as
simpler and more parsimonious. Their criticism aimed also at the nature of
the explanation itself, at its very intelligibility.
Aristotelian physics requires that at least some affective qualities possess
active powers, and that they be thus able to produce qualitative changes in
matter through specific kinds of causation, such as assimilation or alteration,
corruption or genesis. These types of changes are sui generis and irreducible.
For example, sensory perception is considered in De Anima as a type of
alteration; it affects the internal qualities of the sensing body and forces it to
assume the form of the sensed body (AR 663, 674). For the Moderns this kind
of causal action does not make sense any more. There is only one intelligible
way to explain changes in matter, viz. through mechanical causality: bodies
pushing or pulling other bodies, motion communicated through impulse
and impact, and differentiated according to the variety of the shapes and
quantity of matter. One explains a given change only when it has been
reduced to such simple mechanical motions.
This mechanical reductionism is closely related to a new metaphysical
conception of matter. Matter, the stuff which underlies all kinds of bodies,
is no longer conceived as a pure indeterminate substratum, whose elusive
existence is grasped only by abstracting it from the cluster of real qualities
embodied in it. For a Modern, matter is an actual entity, fully determined,
and possessed with ‘catholick affections’ such as shapes and movements.
In consideration of those ‘primary’ qualities, matter is one and the same
in all its manifestations. One may not be able to see this at the level of
our ordinary experience, where bodies seem to belong to various classes
according to the possession of some, apparently irreducible, qualities and
powers. But a common assumption among the moderns is that these specific
differences are all produced by the various arrangements and motions of a
universal matter that is wholly undifferentiated.
This also explains why the new mechanical philosophy has to assume the
form of a corpuscular philosophy (of which atomism is only one type, and
not necessarily the most favoured one). If the variety of material substances
depends only on the various arrangements and movements of its constitutive
parts, there must be some point in the division of a material substance where
the specific properties produced by the texture or arrangement of parts will
entirely disappear. At the sub‐microscopic level of the ‘corpuscle’, there
should be no more composition of parts to be considered: matter should
appear fully homogeneous and possess only its truly ‘catholick’ affections.
This is the significance of Locke's somewhat puzzling ‘division’ argument,
when he explains that the primary qualities are those that a body constantly
keeps, whatever the changes it undergoes through division of parts.
For division (which is all that a Mill, or Pestel, or any other
Body, does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can
never take away either Solidity, Extension, Figure, or Mobility
from any Body, but only makes two, or more distinct separate
masses of Matter, of that which was but one before… (Essay
II. viii. 9)
This has often been represented (and criticized) as an empirical argument
for the distinction of primary and secondary qualities, according to which
invariance through division would be a criterion for primary qualities. That
argument would be subject to the objection that, as long as the divided
parts are still perceptible (or visible in a microscope), they retain some
secondary qualities such as colours; when they are no longer visible, it begs
the question to assert that those qualities would necessarily disappear.
The fact that division cannot in principle affect the determinable spatial
properties, such as the possession of shape or mobility, but somehow
presupposes them, is irrelevant to the demonstration and cannot serve as
a criterion for the distinction. However, Locke's point was not to provide a
justification for primary qualities; he used the physical and mental division
rather as an explanatory device to show what sort of thing a primary or
inseparable quality is. What is implicit here is not so much a new physics, but
its ontological underlying core: the conception of matter as a fully actualized
being, completely undifferentiated at the corpuscular level. On this view,
it is true that only the properties that can be ascribed to the constitutive
undifferentiated parts of matter should be considered as utterly inseparable
qualities of body in the most general sense of the term.3
The contrast, then, between the ancients and the moderns reflects a deep
ontological disagreement concerning the furniture of the physical world, and
the nature of what may count as explanatory entities for natural philosophy.
For the ancients, sensory qualities are reckoned among the ingredients of
material reality, deeply inscribed in its elemental nature, constitutive of
its substantial form, and in some cases (such as heat and cold) causally
responsible for its activity. For the Moderns, they are nothing of the sort.
They are attached to their subject, just as names are attached to the things
named—that is, in virtue of an extrinsic relation to a living being who is
endowed with sense and language. What truly exists in nature is a universal
matter, whose constitutive parts (the corpuscles) are variously arranged and
composed, but otherwise wholly undifferentiated, and which possesses the
only qualities that the mechanical philosophy considers as requisite for an
intelligible explanation of whatever appears in this world.
IV: Epistemology
The ontological distinction between real intrinsic features of the physical
world and features that are only nominal and extrinsic has no immediate
epistemological basis. In both cases quality‐predication is imposed on us by
the very fact of sensory perception: things appear to be coloured, just as
they appear to be extended or solid. This fact is well expressed in Locke's
conception of simple ideas as all equally positive, whatever the reality of
their possible cause (Essay II. viii. 7). It seems natural to assume that the
same sort of ontological and causal structure underlies both appearances. To
justify the distinction, therefore, one needs to loosen the grip of sense and to
make oneself, so to speak, blind, in order to see beyond the surface or to see
‘without the eyes’, if such a feat were ever possible.
The doctrine of a distinction of qualities was widely shared in the
seventeenth century, by philosophers (such as Descartes) who considered
that knowledge in general is gained through an ‘intellectual vision’, and
by so‐called empiricist philosophers (such as Gassendi and Locke), for
whom all knowledge of corporeal things originates in sensory experience.
Consequently, each of them required some sort of access to the distinction
in question. This access might be (a) direct, if one can find, in the very
experience we have of bodies, reasons to think that some qualities are
primary and original; or it may be (b) indirect, through some sort of
hypothetical reasoning and inference to the best explanation.
(a) The direct road to the distinction
One of the direct arguments is expressed in a famous page of Galileo's
Assayer (1623), probably the first fully fledged statement of the modern
doctrine of qualities:
As soon as I think of a material object or a corporeal
substance, I immediately feel the need to conceive
simultaneously that it is bounded and has this or that shape,
that it is big or small in relation to others, that it is in this or
that place at a given time, that it moves or stays still, that it
does or does not touch another body and that it is one, few
or many. I cannot separate it from these conditions by any
stretch of imagination. But my mind feels no compulsion to
understand as necessary accompaniments that it should be
white or red, bitter or sweet, noisy or silent, of sweet or of foul
odour. For that reason, I think that tastes, odors, colors and
so forth are no more than mere names, so far as pertains to
the subject wherein they seem to reside, and that they only
reside in the body that perceives them. Thus, if the living
creature were removed, all these qualities would be removed
and annihilated. (E.N. VI, 347; Shea 1977: 100)
The distinction is presented here, in a first‐person narrative, as the result
of a pure thought‐experiment. The question is not about existing, sensible
corporeal substances, but about constraints and strictures of consciousness.
It asks: what is going on in my mind when I think of a ‘body’? It appears
that, on the one hand, there is a mental necessity or compulsion to link the
concept of body with other concepts, such as shape or motion and rest; on
the other hand, when one comes to other determinable qualities such as
colour or taste, no such need is felt. The mental link between the concept
of body and these latter sensory qualities is experienced as contingent. For
example, it is possible to think of a tasteless or colourless body, but not of
a body without shape. The mental process involved in this experience of
separability or inseparability is a sort of abstraction. Through this mental
process, it seems that I can detach the concept of body from some conditions
or circumstances of its familiar existence, but not from others, and I conclude
that the detachable conditions would never be attributed to the body if I
were not endowed with corporeal senses.
The argument is puzzling. The necessity Galileo tries to capture through
the mental experience is not merely analytical. The essential features of
bodies cannot be essential simply because they are included in a nominal
or conventional definition of bodies. They are supposed to be inseparable in
res and not only in words, and this suggests a number of possible objections.
Berkeley identified one of them when he contended that the modern
distinction between primary and secondary qualities relies on an undue
confidence in the abstracting powers of the mind (BW II 45). Is it really
possible to think of an extended body without giving it a colour? It seems
clear that one cannot think of a colour without giving it an extension, and so
one still has to explain why and in what sense the extended colour does not
pertain to the body, whereas the uncoloured extension does.
Another problem is how far this method of mental analysis should be
considered as capable of securing an exhaustive list of primary or essential
qualities. Shall we say that what holds true for extension, number, or shape,
holds true as well for solidity, cohesion, or gravity? Or shall we count these
latter qualities among the ones that would simply vanish when unperceived?
One may therefore wonder whether it is impossible to consider at least some
of those other qualities as ‘secondary’ in an Aristotelian (not Lockean) sense,
that is, as real qualities resulting from certain combinations or interactions
of primary qualities. But once this possibility is admitted, it seems that there
is nothing in our mental experience to prevent us from drawing the same
conclusion about other sensory qualities, such as colours, and treating them
as real secondary qualities, rather than illusory ones. Last, but not least:
Galileo doesn't even try to explain or justify why a conceptual necessity,
captured through a purely mental process, should describe adequately the
world as it is. Such a justification would require much more metaphysical or
epistemological theorizing than Galileo was willing to provide.
Descartes, another proponent of the direct method, was more alive to the
metaphysical underpinnings of the doctrine. In the Meditations he argued
that, provided that one succeeds in leading the mind away from the senses,
it is possible to access a purely intellectual mode of thinking, which provides
clear and distinct ideas. Since God exists and does not deceive, such ideas
must be considered as representing truly their objects; otherwise our very
nature would be deceitful. Extension, the object of geometry, is one of these
purely intellectual ideas, and it is the only idea of this sort that we have
when we try to get a pure intellectual conception of the external material
substance. Thus, the essence of matter appears to the mind as pure quantity
diffused in length, breadth, and depth. In contrast, ideas of the sense do not
show the intrinsic possibility of what they exhibit and they include a ‘material
falsity’, a structural defect that gives occasion to false judgements (AT VII 43;
CSM II 30).
However, the distinction drawn in the Meditations between the clear and
distinct ideas of extension and its modes on the one hand, and the confused
and obscure ideas of sense on the other, is not identical with the distinction
of primary and secondary qualities. We have sensory (confused) ideas of
determinate extensions, shapes, and movements that can be as deceitful
as our ideas of sounds, colours, or tactile qualities. Thus the argument that
focuses on the fact that our senses are not the source of our knowledge of
bodies but are, at the very best, an occasion for it, does not directly address
the distinction between real and imputed qualities. However, it serves as an
important basis for a direct argument that is found rather inconspicuously in
the Principles.
If, whenever our hands moved in a given direction, all the
bodies in that area were to move away at the same speed
as that of our approaching hands, we should never have any
sensation of hardness. And since it is quite unintelligible to
suppose that, if bodies did move away in this fashion, they
would thereby lose their bodily nature, it follows that this
nature cannot consist in hardness. By the same reasoning it
can be shown that weight, colour, and all other such qualities
that are perceived by the senses as being in corporeal matter,
can be removed from it, while the matter itself remains intact;
it thus follows that its nature does not depend on any of these
qualities. (AT VIII‐1 42; CSM I 224)
The argument is similar to the one Galileo had devised in the Assayer: in
both cases a thought experiment serves as a test for the mental separability
or inseparability of qualities. But here the distinction of qualities is the result
of an active (although purely mental) process in which we consider the partly
confused ideas that we have of particular bodies and, so to speak, put them
mentally to a test. We submit the particular body, invested with its various
apparent qualities, to some imaginary actions, such as moving it or moving
with it, dividing it, etc. These actions, whose effects are mentally anticipated
through what Gareth Evans has aptly called ‘a natively given primitive
mechanics’ (Evans 1996: 271), allow us to grasp what is really inseparable
from bodies (e.g. spatial properties, aptness to move) and what is not (e.g.
hardness).
Besides, the Cartesian version of the thought experiment can stand on
a firmer metaphysical basis. To this end the Meditations had provided at
least three important elements: (i) the very possibility of a pure intellectual
consideration of bodies has been secured through radical doubt; even though
we do not have any body or organs to sense material things, we might
still be able to know them. This is a sophisticated version of the animal‐
annihilation hypothesis. ‘I shall consider myself as not having hands or
eyes, or flesh or blood or senses, but as falsely believing that I have all
these things’ (AT VII 23; CSM II 15); (ii) God's veracity allows us to adopt
the rule that whatever is clearly and distinctly conceived of something may
be said truly of that thing. This implies that whatever is conceived clearly
and distinctly as belonging to a particular body either exists, or at least can
exist as a genuine intrinsic property of that body; (iii) finally, the doctrine of
confused ideas and of material falsity is important at least negatively, in that
it shows why, whenever the question of the essence of matter is at stake, we
must not rely on the ideas of sense, which are apt to represent to us what is
not as if it were something.
(b) The direct road: empiricist strategies, and empiricist critics
In the Essay (II. viii), Locke mentioned a number of facts which have often
been considered as ‘empirical motives’ for adopting the distinction between
real and imputed qualities. For example, the same flame at different
distances produces in us sensations of warmth or pain (§16); the same water
is cold to one hand and hot to another (§21); porphyry ceases to appear
red and white whenever light is prevented from striking on it (§19); an
almond changes its colour and taste when it is reduced to powder (§20).
Several other similar facts (including facts about diseases that affect our
perception of tastes or colours) are mentioned in the early modern literature
on qualities. They suggest that there are some qualities that can be altered
radically and even converted into their contrary (such as hot and cold), or
affected with contrary existential value (such as agreeable and painful) on
account of a mere circumstantial change, such as the location of the sensible
object in relation to the percipient, the internal disposition of the sensitive
body, the illumination of the object, or its state of division.
These changes are circumstantial because, whereas they affect significantly
our sensory ideas, they cannot (with the possible exception of the ground
almond) be reasonably thought of as affecting the internal structure of the
body in question, which, to all appearances, remains the same. It is not
only that the same object appears under different perspectives at different
times, or to different persons—since perspectival relativity applies first and
foremost to primary qualities, it cannot function as a possible criterion; it
also causes us to attribute incompatible properties to the body. This strong
relativity would be understandable if the ideas of those qualities were not
instantiations of ‘real qualities’ possessed by the bodies themselves but
rather (as is commonly thought of pain) if they were only effects of the
bodies on our sensory organs, with no resemblance whatsoever with their
cause.
However, it is not enough to show that at least some secondary qualities
in given couples of contraries (such as hot and cold, sweet and sour) are
necessarily without an archetype (external resemblance) and as such are
purely mental; one has also to understand that it is a common feature of
both contraries and of all secondary qualities whatsoever. Since we know
that any sensation may be without an archetype, and since there is no
phenomenal feature in sensations themselves that may justify us in saying,
for example, that warmth is more real than cold, both may proceed from the
same sort of cause: what has appeared necessarily true of the one should
also be true of the other.
If thus construed, the empiricist argument about secondary qualities does
not prove what it is supposed to prove. Or rather, it proves too much. On
empiricist standards, such as the ones Berkeley thought he shared with
Locke, we do not have any idea of an extended body except through the
sensory ideas (or impressions) that we have of its minimal parts of coloured
extension or tangible (solid) extension. So if the demonstration quoted
above were both empirically grounded and valid, it must apply not only
to colour or other secondary qualities considered in abstracto, but also to
whatever cannot be thought of but as coloured or tangible, that is, to the
very primary properties that the modern doctrine of qualities considered as
existing independently of us. Hume summarized the unavoidable conclusion:
‘instead of explaining the operation of external objects by its [the doctrine
of qualities] means, we utterly annihilate all these objects, and reduce
ourselves to the opinions of the most extravagant skepticism concerning
them’ (Hume 1985: 277). The very argument adduced to prove the modern
theory of qualities leads us to conclusions that are directly opposite to the
convictions the doctrine was supposed to express and ground: the external
reality of primary qualities and the modern scientific image.
In summary, the direct road has proved a difficult one. In both forms (as a
result of a thought experiment, or as a conclusion from empirical facts about
our sensations), it reveals severe weaknesses. One may conclude that it was
probably not because of such arguments that the modern mind found the
theory of qualities so convincing.
(c) The indirect road: sense‐perception and mechanism
Although the standard interpretation of Locke construes his discussion
as providing empirical arguments for the distinction of qualities, there is
a growing consensus among scholars in favour of an alternative reading
(Mandelbaum 1964; Curley 1972; Alexander 1985). The Essay is now
generally read against the background of Boyle's mechanical and corpuscular
hypothesis, and the putative empirical arguments outlined above are now
considered rather as ‘clarifying examples of the power of corpuscularian
explanations’ (Wilson 1992: 220). That hypothesis explains why it may be
possible for the same water to appear hot to one hand and cold to another
because of the mechanical interactions, at the corpuscular level, between
external bodies and the senses.
Locke himself had presented his discussion of qualities as a digression into
physical considerations, whose aim was to make the reader understand the
nature of sensation and the important distinction between ideas and qualities
(Essay II. viii. 22). This digression shows how, according to the corpuscular
hypothesis, ideas (of the senses) are produced in the mind through the
action of external objects. According to the mechanical philosophy, action
through contact and impulse is the only intelligible way bodies can be
conceived to operate one upon the other (Essay II. viii. 11). Whenever it
seems that such contact is missing, one has to postulate some invisible
threads, corpuscles, or effluvia that connect the cause and the effects.
In the case of vision (in which sensory perception seems to occur at a
distance), this contact action is effected by light, whose corpuscles, variously
reflected by the surface structures of the bodies, affect the retina with
various motions and forces. This affection can then be propagated to the
brain, either through vibrations of an internal fluid or by direct impulse, and
can contribute to form there some sort of image or, in Newton's language, a
‘motional picture’ (Newton 1959–97, II: Letter 264). The mental counterpart
of this process takes place at the very end of it, when cerebral motions or
pictures, acting, so to speak, directly ‘against’ the soul, cause the mind to
have various ‘ideas’ or ‘sentiments’.
Such description of the mechanism of sensory perception owes much to the
theories of visual perception devised in the first half of the century in the
optical works of Kepler and Descartes. Kepler, through geometrical analysis
and insights from contemporary anatomists (such as Felix Plater or Fabrizio
d'Aquapendente) discovered that the eye functions as a ‘camera obscura’:
the crystalline is a lens, refracting the rays of light, and the retina is a screen,
receiving a two dimensional picture of the external visual hemisphere (KGW
II: 151; Crombie 1964: 147). Unlike the ‘sensible species’ of the ancient
theories, this pictura is not some sort of specular image of the external
hemisphere, floating as it were in the transparent parts of the eye, and then
transmitted through the supposedly hollow canal of the optic nerve to the
inner cells of the ‘ultimate sentient’. Recent anatomical observations had
shown that there was no canal of any sort inside the optic nerve that would
allow for such transmission. Rather, the retinal picture is a ‘penetrating
affection’, which affects the ‘animal spirits’4 filling the optic nerve in a fully
physical way, described in Kepler's Dioptrics as a kind of combustion (KGW IV
372). Such analysis made clear that the image produced in the eye, to which
our conscious vision is congruent, is, in many ways, distinct from the external
object producing it. One important difference is the fact that one dimension
is lost: the picture is a perspective image projected on a curved surface,
and as such submitted to a number of geometrical distortions. However,
this discrepancy is no obstacle to representation. As Descartes will say:
‘the perfection of an image often depends on its not resembling its object
as much as it might’ (AT VII 113; CSM I 165). Thus, just as in perspective
painting, the retinal picture provides the judgement with indirect signs for
tri‐dimensional visual properties. Such analysis reveals that the eye is no
longer a mere receptor of the form of the sensible; it plays an active role in
reshaping the information transmitted by the rays of light, disfiguring it or
rather encoding it, so that the input from the external world is converted into
something that can adequately move the material spirits circulating in the
nerve connecting the retina to the brain, and there properly affect the seat of
sensation.
It is possible that Kepler was not himself fully conscious of the conceptual
change involved in his new theory of vision, but Descartes, who extensively
drew on Kepler's descriptions, definitely was. According to Descartes'
Dioptrics, sensory perception does not require that any resemblances or
‘images voltigeantes’ issue from things and then pass through the organs of
vision to the seat of sensation. All that is required is that some movement
or pressure be communicated to the organ and appropriately transmitted to
the brain, where it gives ‘occasion’ to the mind to have various ideas. In such
a theory, there is no reason why the (mental) effect should resemble the
(physical) cause. One has only to suppose, in accordance with the doctrine
of mind–body union, that the motion in the brain is constituted by nature
in such a way that it regularly produces the mental effect: ‘It can also be
proved that the nature of our mind is such that the mere occurrence of
certain motions in the body can stimulate it to have all manner of thoughts
which have no likeness to the movements in question. This is especially true
of the confused thoughts we call sensations or feelings’ (AT VIII‐1 320; CSM
1 284). Thus, the relation between cerebral movements and sensory ideas is
a causal relation, not a cognitive one. Its nomological structure is the result
of an arbitrary (although natural) institution connecting a mind to a body.
Without such an institution, the soul, by its own nature, would not be able to
react to the motions produced in the brain to which it is present, any more
than it is actually able to read similar motions in other brains, or directly in
the external world.
We are now in position to formulate the indirect argument for the new theory
of qualities. It stands on two connected grounds. On the one hand, there is
the causal analysis of sensory perception that we have just outlined. The
organs of sense are not neutral receptacles of the sensible form, but rather
mechanical devices whose function is to transmit corpuscular motions from
the outer world and convert them into physiological events and cerebral
configurations, to which the soul reacts in a constrained manner. Thus, the
mere fact that we have sensory experiences is no longer a good reason for
endowing objects with secondary qualities that resemble them. The only
conclusion to which we are entitled is that the external bodies possess some
(causal) powers or dispositions to produce certain ideas in us.5
On the other hand there is the superior heuristic value of the mechanical
hypothesis, its explanatory success and promise. Reducing matter to its
mechanical (or primary) properties alone will allow us to satisfy the need
for a pervasive explanatory principle in physics, a principle that is both
simpler and more intelligible than the real qualities of the Ancients. It will
also offer side‐benefits, of no slight import, such as the one mentioned by
Malebranche in the Search after Truth: if we suppose that there exist in
matter other intrinsic qualities of which we know nothing, then how shall we
answer libertines and atheists who argue that the matter of the brain can
think in virtue of some unknown power (OCM III 466; MLO 246).
So goes the indirect argument: the modern scientific image and its new
ontology of qualities will provide us with the best explanation of the physical
world; and sensory experience no longer provides any objection to this
image. On the contrary, the causal process involved in sensation is an almost
ordinary instance of mechanical action through local contact and ‘impulse’,
and its final result, the mental effect, no longer belongs to the physical
realm.
The hypothetical or indirect road towards the modern theory of qualities
appears to have been the one most trodden in early modern philosophy.
Even philosophers who devised a priori arguments for the distinction appear
to have done it in order to give a metaphysical basis to a conviction that was
first framed by considering the superior heuristic value of the mechanical
hypothesis. This is especially apparent in Descartes' early physics, in texts
such as the Treatise of the World and the Treatise of Man, which make
extensive use of a hypothetical method (the ‘fable’). There Descartes asserts
that, in a hypothetical world of matter conceived as pure quantity, consisting
of extended parts of various shapes and sizes, subject to a small number
of basic mechanical laws, any effect that is ordinarily attributed to the so‐
called real qualities of bodies, either occult or manifest, active or passive,
can be intelligibly produced and explained (AT IX 25–6; CSM I 89). In the
Treatise of Man in particular, one can see that the whole range of known
animal reactions and behaviours may be explained if the organs of sense are
mechanically affected by matter in its various arrangements and motions in
as many ways as there are secondary qualities that affect us differently.
(d) The false imputation of the sense
One last question is in order: how can the false imputation of the senses be
explained, justified, and accounted for within the general scheme of God's
Providence, to which most philosophers in the early modern period were still
so deeply attached?
At the end of Part I of the Principles, Descartes offers a plausible psycho‐
genetic explanation of why we falsely attribute to things sensations that do
not accurately represent anything in them.
It is here that the first and main cause of all our errors may
be recognized. In our early childhood the mind was so closely
tied to the body that it had no leisure for any thoughts except
those by means of which it had sensory awareness of what
was happening to the body. It did not refer these thoughts to
anything outside itself, but merely felt pain when something
harmful was happening to the body and felt pleasure when
something beneficial occurred. And when nothing very
beneficial or harmful was happening to the body, the mind had
various sensations corresponding to the different areas where,
and ways in which, the body was being stimulated…sensations
which do not represent anything located outside our thought.
At the same time the mind perceived sizes, shapes, motions
and so on, which were presented to it not as sensations but
as things, or modes of things, existing (or at least capable
of existing) outside thought, although it was not yet aware
of the difference between things and sensations. The next
stage arose when the mechanism of the body…twisted around
aimlessly in all directions in its random attempts to pursue
the beneficial and avoid the harmful; at this point the mind
that was attached to the body began to notice that the objects
of this pursuit or avoidance had an existence outside itself.
And it attributed to them not only sizes, shapes, motions and
the like, which it perceived as things or modes of things, but
also tastes, smells and so on, the sensations of which were, it
realized, produced by the objects in question. (AT VIII‐1 35–6;
CSM I 218–19)
Descartes here proposes an empirical description of the way we acquired
our ideas (and prejudices) about the external world. The false imputation
of secondary qualities is said to result from the very order in which ideas
are acquired—an order that is imposed on us by the biological fact that we
were infants before becoming adults. Prejudices are acquired in childhood,
because the mind is too tied to the body; they are maintained through
a consequent lack of right (pure) reasoning and by the effect of natural
processes, such as the association of ideas. So error is almost unavoidable. It
is inscribed in the very process of men's maturation. How shall we evaluate
this fact? On the one hand, its frequent denunciation by modern philosophers
is justifiable. Obscure ideas, however acquired, should never be considered
as reliable grounds for judgement and, for that reason, men are genuinely
accountable for the false imputation of secondary qualities. Whatever the
incorrigibility of our error, God's veracity is not really at stake.
On the other hand, for Descartes as for many of his successors, the ‘error’
of the senses, because it is natural, must be understood in a providential
setting. According to the genetic description, sensory qualities are usually
related to objects that may affect our bodies with either beneficial or harmful
effects. One is naturally led therefore to use them to acknowledge, and
take advantage of, these biologically prominent features of the external
world. One may go even further in evaluating this functional status of the
senses, following a line of argument developed by Arnauld in On True and
False Ideas. By allowing us to distinguish things according to qualitative
differences that are easy to recognize, such as differences of colour, our
senses as currently constituted are indeed much more efficient than
they would be if they gave us direct access to the corpuscular correlates
of our sensations in the physical world—that is, to subtle differences in
quantity of motion, arrangement, or shapes. Our soul ‘would find it too
difficult to discern the difference in these stimulations, which is only one
of degree’ (Arnauld 1990: 132). It has been argued (Beyssade 2001: 165–
73) that, in this new perspective, secondary qualities are no longer what
hinders our perception of primary ones; instead, they constitute a most
useful key for interpreting them. Arnauld compares secondary qualities
to the ‘rough pattern’ used in tapestry‐work in order to avoid error in the
composition of what are often very slightly differing shades: ‘just as tapestry
workers have a pattern, which they call a “rough pattern”, where the various
shades of the same colour are indicated by completely different colours,
so that they are less liable to mistake them’ (Arnauld 1990: 132). On this
characterization, the ontological predication itself is perhaps no longer at
fault: ‘Thus it was due to our making language match the intentions of the
Author of Nature that we call bodies white, black, or putrid…the intention
of the Author of Nature is that our soul attach colours to them (objects) and
apply them to bodies in some way, in order to distinguish between them
more easily’ (Arnauld 1990: 174–5).
Malebranche on the one hand, and Locke and Berkeley on the other,
expressed similar ideas: they also thought that the organization of sense
perception (not only the sensory qualities, but also the natural judgements
we tend to make while perceiving) constitute an important argument
in favour of the providential disposition of things. Malebranche added a
religious dimension to the argument. God provides secondary qualities (and
the spontaneous natural judgements that result) in order to alleviate the
burden of the human mind, so that it can devote itself to its proper objects of
contemplation, the spiritual goods (OCM XII 98–9).
For Locke, ideas of sense are exactly correlated to powers in things,
and serve as ‘distinguishing characters’ enabling us to know them. In
consequence all simple ideas, including ideas of secondary qualities, can be
said to be real and adequate, despite the fact that they do not all resemble
their objects:
For these several Appearances, being designed to be the
Marks, whereby we are to know, and distinguish Things, which
we have to do with; our Ideas do as well serve us to that
purpose, and are as real distinguishing Characters, whether
they be only constant Effects, or else exact Resemblances
of something in the things themselves: the reality lying in
that steady correspondence, they have with the distinct
Constitutions of real Beings. But whether they answer to those
Constitutions, as to Causes, or Patterns, it matters not; it
suffices, that they are constantly produced by them. (Essay II.
xxx. 2)
Berkeley will draw on this, pushing the Lockean argument to its extreme:
the sensory qualities are not only provided by God as tools for deciphering
the world; they are the very language with which God chose to address us,
designed for directing us in our lives and our knowledge (BW I 231). The
agreement of our sensory ideas with the inner constitution of a putative
external material substance is no longer relevant. The world of sensory
qualities is the only world in which we live; there is no other to be looked for.
Once again the theory of qualities seems, by its own virtue, to revert to its
contrary.
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Notes:
(1) The expression ‘secondary quality’ is very rare in Boyle (Anstey
2000: 39), and is not used in Locke's meaning. The same holds for
Malebranche. Both authors still use the phrase ‘secondary qualities’ in a
rather traditional manner to signify compound qualities that are constructed
out of ‘elementary’ ones. According to Rodis‐Lewis (Malebranche 1979: 1487)
the usual categorization of qualities, into primary (‘elementary’), secondary,
occult, and specific virtues originates in Galen, and receives its canonical
form in Jean Fernel's Universa medicina (1567).
(2) Berkeley contends that the very conception of something unperceived
entails a contradiction: ‘when we do our utmost to conceive the existence of
external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas’ (BW
II, 50).
(3) One may see here an illustration of a ‘transdiction’ principle. The term
has been devised by M. Mandelbaum (1964: 61). It refers to the (perhaps
dubious) inference in virtue of which we extend to the characterization of
invisible bodies properties that have been universally found in the visible
ones—a practice which, according to Mandelbaum, characterizes Early‐
modern corpuscular philosophy, and constitutes a distinctive feature of
Modern realism. Newton, in his third methodological rule, gave to this
transdictive principle its canonical formulation: ‘the qualities of bodies
that cannot be intended and remitted…and that belong to all bodies on
which experiments can be made should be taken as qualities of all bodies
universally’ (Principia 795).
(4) In order to account for the various actions and passions of the animal
body, the Renaissance physiologists had devised the concept of spiritus,
or animal spirit, a subtle fluid infused from the brain into the nerves to
the various parts of the body, allowing sensation to take place whenever
this spiritus is touched or affected. By the end of the sixteenth century,
through the works of Jean Fernel, Pierre Severin, and Tommaso Campanella,
the spiritus has been progressively unified, naturalized, and conceived
sometimes in atomistic terms. But it is only in the physiological works of
Isaac Beeckmann, Descartes' friend and mentor in the formative years, that
the spiritus was for the first time understood in a fully mechanistic sense.
Beeckmann provided a hydro‐dynamical model that Descartes took over
and refined. This physiological part of the story (de Calan 2008) is of crucial
importance to understand the genesis of the modern concept of ‘sensation’.
(5) However, Locke, following a tradition that originated in Gassendist
physics and had been transmitted to him through the works of William Digby,
Walter Charleton, Thomas Willis, and Robert Boyle, is taking a step beyond
this strict conclusion when he contends that those powers are each of them
causally dependent on specific arrangements of the particles of the bodies
(see Essay II. viii. 13). So (and one may see here an important specificity of
this tradition) each secondary quality has a true individualized correlate in
the physical world, a corpuscular texture, or molecular composition, exerting
a specific ‘chemical’ action on the spirits (de Calan 2008: 270–393).
